security: Removing the old wrappers and replacing with 'permissions-wrappers'

This commit is contained in:
Parnell Springmeyer 2016-07-15 18:05:28 -05:00
parent c16647ec29
commit 79e81aa31b
7 changed files with 293 additions and 86 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
inherit (config.security) permissionsWrapperDir;
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
setcapWrappers = import ./setcap-wrapper-drv.nix { };
setuidWrappers = import ./setuid-wrapper-drv.nix { };
###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers
configureSetcapWrapper =
{ program
, capabilities
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setcap ? false
}:
''
cp ${setcapWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so
# the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on
# its file into the Ambient set.
#
# Only set the capabilities though if we're being told to
# do so.
${
if setcap then
''
${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
''
else ""
}
# Set the executable bit
chmod u+rx,g+x,o+x ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
'';
###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers
setuidPrograms =
(map (x: { program = x; owner = "root"; group = "root"; setuid = true; })
config.security.setuidPrograms)
++ config.security.setuidOwners;
makeSetuidWrapper =
{ program
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setuid ? false
, setgid ? false
, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
}:
''
cp ${setuidWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
'';
in
{
###### interface
options = {
security.permissionsWrappers.setcap = mkOption {
type = types.listOf types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "ping";
source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping"
owner = "nobody";
group = "nogroup";
setcap = true;
capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep";
}
];
description = ''
This option sets capabilities on a wrapper program that
propagates those capabilities down to the wrapped, real
program.
The `program` attribute is the name of the program to be
wrapped. If no `source` attribute is provided, specifying the
absolute path to the program, then the program will be
searched for in the path environment variable.
NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper program
to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT raised to
the Ambient set so that the real program cannot modify its own
capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for cases in which
the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at least leans on
the side security paranoid vs. too relaxed.
The attribute `setcap` defaults to false and it will create a
wrapper program but never set the capability set on it. This
is done so that you can remove a capability sent entirely from
a wrapper program without also needing to go change any
absolute paths that may be directly referencing the wrapper
program.
'';
};
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid = mkOption {
type = types.listOf types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "sendmail";
source = "${pkgs.sendmail.bin}/bin/sendmail";
owner = "nobody";
group = "postdrop";
setuid = false;
setgid = true;
permissions = "u+rx,g+x,o+x";
}
];
description = ''
This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid
wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the
default (setuid root, but not setgid root).
'';
};
security.permissionsWrapperDir = mkOption {
type = types.path;
default = "/var/permissions-wrappers";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the path to the permissions wrappers. It
should not be overriden.
'';
};
};
###### implementation
config = {
# Make sure our setcap-wrapper dir exports to the PATH env
# variable when initializing the shell
environment.extraInit = ''
# The permissions wrappers override other bin directories.
export PATH="${config.security.permissionsWrapperDir}:$PATH"
'';
###### setcap activation script
system.activationScripts.setcap =
stringAfter [ "users" ]
''
# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
# programs to be wrapped.
PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
# When a program is removed from the security.permissionsWrappers.setcap
# list we have to remove all of the previous program wrappers
# and re-build them minus the wrapper for the program removed,
# hence the rm here in the activation script.
rm -f ${permissionsWrapperDir}/*
# Concatenate the generated shell slices to configure
# wrappers for each program needing specialized capabilities.
${concatMapStrings configureSetcapWrapper cfg.setcap}
'';
###### setuid activation script
system.activationScripts.setuid =
stringAfter [ "users" ]
''
# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
# programs to be wrapped.
PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
# When a program is removed from the security.permissionsWrappers.setcap
# list we have to remove all of the previous program wrappers
# and re-build them minus the wrapper for the program removed,
# hence the rm here in the activation script.
rm -f ${permissionsWrapperDir}/*
# Concatenate the generated shell slices to configure
# wrappers for each program needing specialized capabilities.
${concatMapStrings configureSetuidWrapper cfg.setuid}
'';
};
}

View file

@ -8,11 +8,6 @@
#include <dirent.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
// Make sure assertions are not compiled out, we use them to codify
// invariants about this program and we want it to fail fast and
@ -26,6 +21,24 @@ extern char **environ;
static char * sourceProg = SOURCE_PROG;
static char * wrapperDir = WRAPPER_DIR;
// Make sure we have the WRAPPER_TYPE macro specified at compile
// time...
#ifdef WRAPPER_SETCAP
static char * wrapperType = "setcap";
#elif defined WRAPPER_SETUID
static char * wrapperType = "setuid";
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Program must be compiled with either the WRAPPER_SETCAP or WRAPPER_SETUID macros specified!\n");
exit(1);
#endif
#ifdef WRAPPER_SETCAP
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
// Update the capabilities of the running process to include the given
// capability in the Ambient set.
static void set_ambient_cap(cap_value_t cap)
@ -150,6 +163,7 @@ static int make_caps_ambient(const char *selfPath)
return 0;
}
#endif
int main(int argc, char * * argv)
{

View file

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
# Produce a shell-code splice intended to be stitched into one of
# the build or install phases within the derivation.
mkSetcapWrapper = { program, source ? null, ...}:
''
if ! source=${if source != null then source else "$(readlink -f $(PATH=$PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH type -tP ${program}))"}; then
# If we can't find the program, fall back to the
# system profile.
source=/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/${program}
fi
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETCAP=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${cfg.permissionsWrapperDir}\" \
-lcap-ng -lcap ${./permissions-wrapper.c} -o $out/bin/${program}.wrapper
'';
in
# This is only useful for Linux platforms and a kernel version of
# 4.3 or greater
assert pkgs.stdenv.isLinux;
assert lib.versionAtLeast (lib.getVersion config.boot.kernelPackages.kernel) "4.3";
pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
name = "setcap-wrapper";
unpackPhase = "true";
buildInputs = [ pkgs.linuxHeaders pkgs.libcap pkgs.libcap_ng ];
installPhase = ''
mkdir -p $out/bin
# Concat together all of our shell splices to compile
# binary wrapper programs for all configured setcap programs.
${concatMapStrings mkSetcapWrapper cfg.setcap}
'';
};

View file

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
# Produce a shell-code splice intended to be stitched into one of
# the build or install phases within the derivation.
mkSetuidWrapper = { program, source ? null, ...}:
''
if ! source=${if source != null then source else "$(readlink -f $(PATH=$PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH type -tP ${program}))"}; then
# If we can't find the program, fall back to the
# system profile.
source=/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/${program}
fi
gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_SETUID=1 -DSOURCE_PROG=\"$source\" -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${cfg.permissionsWrapperDir}\" \
-lcap-ng -lcap ${./permissions-wrapper.c} -o $out/bin/${program}.wrapper
'';
in
# This is only useful for Linux platforms and a kernel version of
# 4.3 or greater
assert pkgs.stdenv.isLinux;
assert lib.versionAtLeast (lib.getVersion config.boot.kernelPackages.kernel) "4.3";
pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
name = "setuid-wrapper";
unpackPhase = "true";
installPhase = ''
mkdir -p $out/bin
# Concat together all of our shell splices to compile
# binary wrapper programs for all configured setcap programs.
${concatMapStrings mkSetuidWrapper cfg.setuid}
'';
};

View file

@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
/* Make sure assertions are not compiled out. */
#undef NDEBUG
extern char **environ;
static char * wrapperDir = WRAPPER_DIR;
int main(int argc, char * * argv)
{
char self[PATH_MAX];
int len = readlink("/proc/self/exe", self, sizeof(self) - 1);
assert (len > 0);
self[len] = 0;
/* Make sure that we are being executed from the right location,
i.e., `wrapperDir'. This is to prevent someone from
creating hard link `X' from some other location, along with a
false `X.real' file, to allow arbitrary programs from being
executed setuid. */
assert ((strncmp(self, wrapperDir, strlen(wrapperDir)) == 0) &&
(self[strlen(wrapperDir)] == '/'));
/* Make *really* *really* sure that we were executed as `self',
and not, say, as some other setuid program. That is, our
effective uid/gid should match the uid/gid of `self'. */
//printf("%d %d\n", geteuid(), getegid());
struct stat st;
assert (lstat(self, &st) != -1);
//printf("%d %d\n", st.st_uid, st.st_gid);
assert ((st.st_mode & S_ISUID) == 0 ||
(st.st_uid == geteuid()));
assert ((st.st_mode & S_ISGID) == 0 ||
st.st_gid == getegid());
/* And, of course, we shouldn't be writable. */
assert (!(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)));
/* Read the path of the real (wrapped) program from <self>.real. */
char realFN[PATH_MAX + 10];
int realFNSize = snprintf (realFN, sizeof(realFN), "%s.real", self);
assert (realFNSize < sizeof(realFN));
int fdSelf = open(realFN, O_RDONLY);
assert (fdSelf != -1);
char real[PATH_MAX];
len = read(fdSelf, real, PATH_MAX);
assert (len != -1);
assert (len < sizeof (real));
assert (len > 0);
real[len] = 0;
close(fdSelf);
//printf("real = %s, len = %d\n", real, len);
execve(real, argv, environ);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot run `%s': %s\n",
argv[0], real, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}