diff --git a/pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/source/sandbox_userns_36.patch b/pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/source/sandbox_userns_36.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6f5d52b72af..00000000000 --- a/pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/source/sandbox_userns_36.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,287 +0,0 @@ -commit 0fec7e4a742f001c9816a8b58a1120fb44230867 -Author: aszlig -Date: Thu May 16 14:17:56 2013 +0200 - - zygote: Add support for user namespaces on Linux. - - The implementation is done by patching the Zygote host to execute the sandbox - binary with CLONE_NEWUSER and setting the uid and gid mapping so that the child - process is using uid 0 and gid 0 which map to the current user of the parent. - Afterwards, the sandbox will continue as if it was called as a setuid binary. - - In addition, this adds new_user_namespace as an option in process_util in order - to set the UID and GID mapping correctly. The reason for this is that just - passing CLONE_NEWUSER to clone_flags doesn't help in LaunchProcess(), because - without setting the mappings exec*() will clear the process's capability sets. - - If the kernel doesn't support unprivileged user namespaces and the sandbox - binary doesn't have the setuid flag, the Zygote main process will run without a - sandbox. This is to mimic the behaviour if no SUID sandbox binary path is set. - - Signed-off-by: aszlig - -diff --git a/base/process/launch.cc b/base/process/launch.cc -index 81748f5..930f20f 100644 ---- a/base/process/launch.cc -+++ b/base/process/launch.cc -@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ LaunchOptions::LaunchOptions() - #if defined(OS_LINUX) - , clone_flags(0) - , allow_new_privs(false) -+ , new_user_namespace(false) - #endif // OS_LINUX - #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) - , ctrl_terminal_fd(-1) -diff --git a/base/process/launch.h b/base/process/launch.h -index 9e39fba..00e4c79 100644 ---- a/base/process/launch.h -+++ b/base/process/launch.h -@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ struct BASE_EXPORT LaunchOptions { - // By default, child processes will have the PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS bit set. If - // true, then this bit will not be set in the new child process. - bool allow_new_privs; -+ -+ // If true, start the process in a new user namespace. -+ bool new_user_namespace; - #endif // defined(OS_LINUX) - - #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) -diff --git a/base/process/launch_posix.cc b/base/process/launch_posix.cc -index 457234f..a99ce9b 100644 ---- a/base/process/launch_posix.cc -+++ b/base/process/launch_posix.cc -@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ - - #if defined(OS_LINUX) - #include -+#include -+#if !defined(CLONE_NEWUSER) -+#define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000 -+#endif - #endif - - #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) -@@ -301,13 +305,23 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector& argv, - - pid_t pid; - #if defined(OS_LINUX) -- if (options.clone_flags) { -+ int map_pipe_fd[2]; -+ int flags = options.clone_flags; -+ -+ if (options.new_user_namespace) { -+ flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER; -+ if (pipe(map_pipe_fd) < 0) { -+ DPLOG(ERROR) << "user namespace pipe"; -+ return false; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (options.clone_flags || options.new_user_namespace) { - // Signal handling in this function assumes the creation of a new - // process, so we check that a thread is not being created by mistake - // and that signal handling follows the process-creation rules. -- RAW_CHECK( -- !(options.clone_flags & (CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM))); -- pid = syscall(__NR_clone, options.clone_flags, 0, 0, 0); -+ RAW_CHECK(!(flags & (CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM))); -+ pid = syscall(__NR_clone, flags, 0, 0, 0); - } else - #endif - { -@@ -328,6 +342,21 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector& argv, - // DANGER: no calls to malloc or locks are allowed from now on: - // http://crbug.com/36678 - -+#if defined(OS_LINUX) -+ if (options.new_user_namespace) { -+ // Close the write end of the pipe so we get an EOF when the parent closes -+ // the FD. This is to avoid race conditions when the UID/GID mappings are -+ // written _after_ execvp(). -+ close(map_pipe_fd[1]); -+ -+ char dummy; -+ if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(map_pipe_fd[0], &dummy, 1)) != 0) { -+ RAW_LOG(ERROR, "Unexpected input in uid/gid mapping pipe."); -+ _exit(127); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - // DANGER: fork() rule: in the child, if you don't end up doing exec*(), - // you call _exit() instead of exit(). This is because _exit() does not - // call any previously-registered (in the parent) exit handlers, which -@@ -452,6 +481,40 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector& argv, - _exit(127); - } else { - // Parent process -+#if defined(OS_LINUX) -+ if (options.new_user_namespace) { -+ // We need to write UID/GID mapping here to map the current user outside -+ // the namespace to the root user inside the namespace in order to -+ // correctly "fool" the child process. -+ char buf[256]; -+ int map_fd, map_len; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid); -+ map_fd = open(buf, O_RDWR); -+ DPCHECK(map_fd >= 0); -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0 %d 1", geteuid()); -+ map_len = strlen(buf); -+ if (write(map_fd, buf, map_len) != map_len) { -+ RAW_LOG(WARNING, "Can't write to uid_map."); -+ } -+ close(map_fd); -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/gid_map", pid); -+ map_fd = open(buf, O_RDWR); -+ DPCHECK(map_fd >= 0); -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0 %d 1", getegid()); -+ map_len = strlen(buf); -+ if (write(map_fd, buf, map_len) != map_len) { -+ RAW_LOG(WARNING, "Can't write to gid_map."); -+ } -+ close(map_fd); -+ -+ // Close the pipe on the parent, so the child can continue doing the -+ // execvp() call. -+ close(map_pipe_fd[1]); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.wait) { - // While this isn't strictly disk IO, waiting for another process to - // finish is the sort of thing ThreadRestrictions is trying to prevent. -diff --git a/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc b/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc -index 9d63ad9..0885705 100644 ---- a/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc -+++ b/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc -@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ void ZygoteHostImpl::Init(const std::string& sandbox_cmd) { - // A non empty sandbox_cmd means we want a SUID sandbox. - using_suid_sandbox_ = !sandbox_cmd.empty(); - -+ bool userns_sandbox = false; -+ const std::vector cmd_line_unwrapped(cmd_line.argv()); -+ - // Start up the sandbox host process and get the file descriptor for the - // renderers to talk to it. - const int sfd = RenderSandboxHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetRendererSocket(); -@@ -156,11 +159,24 @@ void ZygoteHostImpl::Init(const std::string& sandbox_cmd) { - sandbox_client->PrependWrapper(&cmd_line); - sandbox_client->SetupLaunchOptions(&options, &fds_to_map, &dummy_fd); - sandbox_client->SetupLaunchEnvironment(); -+ userns_sandbox = sandbox_client->IsNoSuid(); - } - - base::ProcessHandle process = -1; - options.fds_to_remap = &fds_to_map; -+ if (userns_sandbox) -+ options.new_user_namespace = true; - base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line.argv(), options, &process); -+ -+ if (process == -1 && userns_sandbox) { -+ LOG(ERROR) << "User namespace sandbox failed to start, running without " -+ << "sandbox! You need at least kernel 3.8.0 with CONFIG_USER_NS " -+ << "enabled in order to use the sandbox without setuid bit."; -+ using_suid_sandbox_ = false; -+ options.new_user_namespace = false; -+ base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line_unwrapped, options, &process); -+ } -+ - CHECK(process != -1) << "Failed to launch zygote process"; - dummy_fd.reset(); - -diff --git a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc -index 11f0602..b7b8214 100644 ---- a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc -+++ b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc -@@ -389,6 +389,13 @@ static bool EnterSuidSandbox(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox) { - CHECK(CreateInitProcessReaper()); - } - -+ // Don't set non-dumpable, as it causes trouble when the host tries to find -+ // the zygote process (XXX: Not quite sure why this happens with user -+ // namespaces). Fortunately, we also have the seccomp filter sandbox which -+ // should disallow the use of ptrace. -+ if (setuid_sandbox->IsNoSuid()) -+ return true; -+ - #if !defined(OS_OPENBSD) - // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the - // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was -diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc -index fc03cdd..a972faa 100644 ---- a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc -+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc -@@ -229,6 +229,10 @@ bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsInNewNETNamespace() const { - return env_->HasVar(kSandboxNETNSEnvironmentVarName); - } - -+bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsNoSuid() const { -+ return env_->HasVar(kSandboxNoSuidVarName); -+} -+ - bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsSandboxed() const { - return sandboxed_; - } -@@ -277,8 +281,7 @@ void SetuidSandboxClient::PrependWrapper(base::CommandLine* cmd_line) { - "LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment."; - } - -- if (access(sandbox_binary.c_str(), X_OK) != 0 || (st.st_uid != 0) || -- ((st.st_mode & S_ISUID) == 0) || ((st.st_mode & S_IXOTH)) == 0) { -+ if (access(sandbox_binary.c_str(), X_OK) != 0) { - LOG(FATAL) << "The SUID sandbox helper binary was found, but is not " - "configured correctly. Rather than run without sandboxing " - "I'm aborting now. You need to make sure that " -@@ -286,6 +289,12 @@ void SetuidSandboxClient::PrependWrapper(base::CommandLine* cmd_line) { - } - - cmd_line->PrependWrapper(sandbox_binary); -+ -+ if (!((st.st_uid == 0) && -+ (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && -+ (st.st_mode & S_IXOTH))) { -+ env_->SetVar(kSandboxNoSuidVarName, "1"); -+ } - } - - void SetuidSandboxClient::SetupLaunchOptions( -diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h -index 2bbad7a..8605475 100644 ---- a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h -+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h -@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ class SANDBOX_EXPORT SetuidSandboxClient { - bool IsInNewPIDNamespace() const; - // Did the setuid helper create a new network namespace ? - bool IsInNewNETNamespace() const; -+ // Is sandboxed without SUID binary ? -+ bool IsNoSuid() const; - // Are we done and fully sandboxed ? - bool IsSandboxed() const; - -diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h -index 9345287..2db659e 100644 ---- a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h -+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ static const char kAdjustOOMScoreSwitch[] = "--adjust-oom-score"; - - static const char kSandboxDescriptorEnvironmentVarName[] = "SBX_D"; - static const char kSandboxHelperPidEnvironmentVarName[] = "SBX_HELPER_PID"; -+static const char kSandboxNoSuidVarName[] = "SBX_NO_SUID"; - - static const long kSUIDSandboxApiNumber = 1; - static const char kSandboxEnvironmentApiRequest[] = "SBX_CHROME_API_RQ"; -diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c -index 7410b71..a83593d 100644 ---- a/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c -+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c -@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static bool DropRoot() { - return false; - } - -- if (setresgid(rgid, rgid, rgid)) { -+ if (egid != rgid && setresgid(rgid, rgid, rgid)) { - perror("setresgid"); - return false; - }