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401 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Domen Kožar b17edbac57 ModemManager: 0.5.4.0 -> 0.7.991 2014-02-08 20:17:00 +01:00
Petr Rockai 12315a278c Merge branch 'yubikey' of git://github.com/Calrama/nixpkgs 2014-02-08 16:01:22 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 09f9af17b4 Update to the Yubikey PBA
Security-relevant changes:
 * No (salted) passphrase hash send to the yubikey, only hash of the salt (as it was in the original implementation).
 * Derive $k_luks with PBKDF2 from the yubikey $response (as the PBKDF2 salt) and the passphrase $k_user
   (as the PBKDF2 password), so that if two-factor authentication is enabled
   (a) a USB-MITM attack on the yubikey itself is not enough to break the system
   (b) the potentially low-entropy $k_user is better protected against brute-force attacks
 * Instead of using uuidgen, gather the salt (previously random uuid / uuid_r) directly from /dev/random.
 * Length of the new salt in byte added as the parameter "saltLength", defaults to 16 byte.
   Note: Length of the challenge is 64 byte, so saltLength > 64 may have no benefit over saltLengh = 64.
 * Length of $k_luks derived with PBKDF2 in byte added as the parameter "keyLength", defaults to 64 byte.
   Example: For a luks device with a 512-bit key, keyLength should be 64.
 * Increase of the PBKDF2 iteration count per successful authentication added as the
   parameter "iterationStep", defaults to 0.

Other changes:
 * Add optional grace period before trying to find the yubikey, defaults to 2 seconds.

Full overview of the yubikey authentication process:

  (1) Read $salt and $iterations from unencrypted device (UD).
  (2) Calculate the $challenge from the $salt with a hash function.
      Chosen instantiation: SHA-512($salt).
  (3) Challenge the yubikey with the $challenge and receive the $response.
  (4) Repeat three times:
    (a) Prompt for the passphrase $k_user.
    (b) Derive the key $k_luks for the luks device with a key derivation function from $k_user and $response.
        Chosen instantiation: PBKDF2(HMAC-SHA-512, $k_user, $response, $iterations, keyLength).
    (c) Try to open the luks device with $k_luks and escape loop (4) only on success.
  (5) Proceed only if luks device was opened successfully, fail otherwise.

  (6) Gather $new_salt from a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
      Chosen instantiation: /dev/random
  (7) Calculate the $new_challenge from the $new_salt with the same hash function as (2).
  (8) Challenge the yubikey with the $new_challenge and receive the $new_response.
  (9) Derive the new key $new_k_luks for the luks device in the same manner as in (4) (b),
      but with more iterations as given by iterationStep.
 (10) Try to change the luks device's key $k_luks to $new_k_luks.
 (11) If (10) was successful, write the $new_salt and the $new_iterations to the UD.
      Note: $new_iterations = $iterations + iterationStep

Known (software) attack vectors:

 * A MITM attack on the keyboard can recover $k_user. This, combined with a USB-MITM
   attack on the yubikey for the $response (1) or the $new_response (2) will result in
   (1) $k_luks being recovered,
   (2) $new_k_luks being recovered.
 * Any attacker with access to the RAM state of stage-1 at mid- or post-authentication
   can recover $k_user, $k_luks, and  $new_k_luks
 * If an attacker has recovered $response or $new_response, he can perform a brute-force
   attack on $k_user with it without the Yubikey needing to be present (using cryptsetup's
   "luksOpen --verify-passphrase" oracle. He could even make a copy of the luks device's
   luks header and run the brute-force attack without further access to the system.
 * A USB-MITM attack on the yubikey will allow an attacker to attempt to brute-force
   the yubikey's internal key ("shared secret") without it needing to be present anymore.

Credits:

 * Florian Klien,
   for the original concept and the reference implementation over at
   https://github.com/flowolf/initramfs_ykfde
 * Anthony Thysse,
   for the reference implementation of accessing OpenSSL's PBKDF2 over at
   http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/anthony/software/pbkdf2.c
2014-02-08 14:59:52 +01:00
Domen Kožar 5ffab7710d gnome3.gnome_control_center: build and fix runtime deps 2014-02-08 12:30:23 +01:00
Bjørn Forsman db12d783ff nixos: add uid/gid for munin
To be compatible with eb2f44c18c (Generate
/etc/passwd and /etc/group at build time). Without this you'll get this:

  $ nixos-rebuild build
  [...]
  user-thrown exception: The option `users.extraGroups.unnamed-9.1.gid' is used but not defined.
2014-02-07 23:08:15 +01:00
Shea Levy e058de1642 Add option to enforce uniqueness of uids/gids (on by default)
Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-07 09:57:28 -05:00
Domen Kožar 506a030b91 gnome3: add missing files 2014-02-07 00:37:17 +01:00
Domen Kožar 65a28e8b73 Add gnome3 desktop manager. Very experimental.
Currently very basic gnome-shell launches on my laptop. Quite some
services won't start yet, most notable is gnome-control-center.

GTK3 apps still don't have theming applied and for example launching
chromium results in horrible red windows.
2014-02-07 00:31:29 +01:00
Domen Kožar 15fb296b43 xfce: partially add gtk3 support 2014-02-07 00:30:21 +01:00
Mathijs Kwik 951f37f3da services.xserver.videoDrivers -> services.mesa.videoDrivers 2014-02-06 10:01:08 +01:00
Vladimír Čunát 4284694439 nixos/mesa: don't create /run/opengl-driver-32 ...
... if on 64-bit and without 32-bit drivers.
Also assert against requesting 32-bit drivers on 32-bit machine.
2014-02-05 19:20:42 +01:00
Rickard Nilsson 72ba2bf126 Add description to group.members option 2014-02-05 15:56:51 +01:00
Rickard Nilsson 0b92ad02c8 Re-introduce security.initialRootPassword, and add a new option users.extraUsers.<user>.hashedPassword 2014-02-05 15:56:51 +01:00
Rickard Nilsson 03ee174032 Only add shadow to system packages if users.mutableUsers is true 2014-02-05 15:56:51 +01:00
Rickard Nilsson eb2f44c18c Generate /etc/passwd and /etc/group at build time
This is a rather large commit that switches user/group creation from using
useradd/groupadd on activation to just generating the contents of /etc/passwd
and /etc/group, and then on activation merging the generated files with the
files that exist in the system. This makes the user activation process much
cleaner, in my opinion.

The users.extraUsers.<user>.uid and users.extraGroups.<group>.gid must all be
properly defined (if <user>.createUser is true, which it is by default). My
pull request adds a lot of uids/gids to config.ids to solve this problem for
existing nixos services, but there might be configurations that break because
this change. However, this will be discovered during the build.

Option changes introduced by this commit:

* Remove the options <user>.isSystemUser and <user>.isAlias since
they don't make sense when generating /etc/passwd statically.

* Add <group>.members as a complement to <user>.extraGroups.

* Add <user>.passwordFile for setting a user's password from an encrypted
(shadow-style) file.

* Add users.mutableUsers which is true by default. This means you can keep
managing your users as previously, by using useradd/groupadd manually. This is
accomplished by merging the generated passwd/group file with the existing files
in /etc on system activation. The merging of the files is simplistic. It just
looks at the user/group names. If a user/group exists both on the system and
in the generated files, the system entry will be kept un-changed and the
generated entries will be ignored. The merging itself is performed with the
help of vipw/vigr to properly lock the account files during edit.
If mutableUsers is set to false, the generated passwd and group files will not
be merged with the system files on activation. Instead they will simply replace
the system files, and overwrite any changes done on the running system. The
same logic holds for user password, if the <user>.password or
<user>.passwordFile options are used. If mutableUsers is false, password will
simply be replaced on activation. If true, the initial user passwords will be
set according to the configuration, but existing passwords will not be touched.

I have tested this on a couple of different systems and it seems to work fine
so far. If you think this is a good idea, please test it. This way of adding
local users has been discussed in issue #103 (and this commit solves that
issue).
2014-02-05 15:56:51 +01:00
Shea Levy bfc682ea37 Mount a ramfs on /run/keys for safe key storage for nixops
Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-05 08:00:19 -05:00
Shea Levy 1e0352f801 Fix gummiboot builder
Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-05 07:54:11 -05:00
Domen Kožar e1b206b4a9 clarify rename error messages 2014-02-04 16:33:01 +01:00
Shea Levy 741cc62f75 Force a rebuild.
Sigh.

Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-04 08:43:45 -05:00
Eelco Dolstra 9e7fe29e41 ntpd: Don't answer status queries
Workaround for CVE-2013-5211:

http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice#DRDoS_Amplification_Attack_using
2014-02-03 23:44:11 +01:00
Shea Levy 5e72e36f95 gummiboot-builder.py: Remove old entries before adding new ones
Fixes #1483

Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-03 17:41:31 -05:00
Shea Levy 448dc031ed Document EFI installation
Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-03 17:05:23 -05:00
Shea Levy d6ef65cb6a Limit livecd label to 11 characters
vfat partition labels can only be 11 characters long

Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-02-03 17:05:04 -05:00
Moritz Maxeiner 8e74e1fded Replace the current Yubikey PBA implementation with the previous one.
Rationale:
  * The main reason for choosing to implement the PBA in accordance
    with the Yubico documentation was to prevent a MITM-USB-attack
    successfully recovering the new LUKS key.
  * However, a MITM-USB-attacker can read user id and password when
    they were entered for PBA, which allows him to recover the new
    challenge after the PBA is complete, with which he can challenge
    the Yubikey, decrypt the new AES blob and recover the LUKS key.
  * Additionally, since the Yubikey shared secret is stored in the
    same AES blob, after such an attack not only is the LUKS device
    compromised, the Yubikey is as well, since the shared secret
    has also been recovered by the attacker.
  * Furthermore, with this method an attacker could also bruteforce
    the AES blob, if he has access to the unencrypted device, which
    would again compromise the Yubikey, should he be successful.
  * Finally, with this method, once the LUKS key has been recovered
    once, the encryption is permanently broken, while with the previous
    system, the LUKS key itself it changed at every successful boot,
    so recovering it once will not necessarily result in a permanent
    breakage and will also not compromise the Yubikey itself (since
    its secret is never stored anywhere but on the Yubikey itself).

Summary:
The current implementation opens up up vulnerability to brute-forcing
the AES blob, while retaining the current MITM-USB attack, additionally
making the consequences of this attack permanent and extending it to
the Yubikey itself.
2014-02-03 22:50:17 +01:00
Oliver Charles 0d18d39e98 switch-to-configuration.pl: Handle successful auto-restarts
switch-to-configuration.pl is currently hard-coded to assume that if a
unit is in the "auto-restart" state that something has gone wrong, but
this is not strictly true. For example, I run offlineimap as a oneshot
service restarting itself every minute (on success). NixOS currently
thinks that offlineimap has failed to start as it enters the
auto-restart state, because it doesn't consider why the unit failed.

This commit changes switch-to-configuration.pl to inspect the full
status of a unit in auto-restart state, and now only considers it failed
if the ExecMainStatus is non-zero.
2014-02-02 15:56:22 +01:00
Vladimír Čunát 4a55391f1f Merge #1645 and #1646: lightdm and -gtk-greeter update 2014-02-02 15:51:35 +01:00
Vladimír Čunát b5a32b3944 Merge #1618: use ubuntu module blacklists by default 2014-02-02 15:51:07 +01:00
Jaka Hudoklin b6e3cd7170 nixos/nscd: add option to change nscd config
[Bjørn Forsman <bjorn.forsman@gmail.com>:
 - use types.lines instead of types.string. The former joins strings
   with "\n" and the latter with "" (and is deprecated).
]
2014-02-02 15:31:55 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra 559f5be07d dhcpcd: Update to 6.2.1
Dhcpcd now has integration with udev, so it should no longer be a
problem if udev renames an interface while dhcpcd is running.
2014-02-02 11:28:45 +01:00
Arvin Moezzi 0602ef22de git-daemon service: fix typo in option (close #1659) 2014-02-01 11:56:56 +01:00
Rob Vermaas 9b1bd84940 httpd: Respect original order of environment eval. 2014-01-31 21:18:24 +01:00
Rob Vermaas bfa56d7657 httpd: Only add PHPRC to environment of httpd when enablePHP is true. 2014-01-31 21:14:05 +01:00
Oliver Charles 32a08d0846 lightdm: Update to 1.8.6 2014-01-31 12:42:03 +00:00
Petr Rockai 2062abfd4f Merge branch 'yubikey' of git://github.com/Calrama/nixpkgs 2014-01-29 18:54:07 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 7bf94cadad Add library dependencies explicitly 2014-01-29 18:49:26 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner e96f58ef5c Implement muli-user authentication for yubikey pba, i.e. multiple users can now share a single luks keyslot.
This is achieved by having multiple lines per storage file, one for each user (if the feature is enabled); each of these
lines has the same format as would be the case for the userless authentication, except that they are prepended with a
SHA-512 of the user's id.
2014-01-29 17:20:05 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 20cfaf0faa Change the crypt-storage file to be hex encoded instead of raw binary. To update from the previous configuration, convert your crypt-storage file from raw binary to hex. 2014-01-29 13:58:35 +01:00
aszlig 795941261a
nixos-generate-config: Fix reference to <nixos>.
IIUC, <nixos> is going to be deprecated someday in the future, and as
most of those references are already replaced I guess it's safe to
replace it here as well, as it is only relevant on new/updated
installations.

Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
2014-01-29 13:23:30 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner cce9712331 Enable two-factor authentication by default. Add proper descriptions to attributes. 2014-01-29 12:55:32 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 45b1ffb8db Cosmetic change to yubikey detection 2014-01-28 20:39:46 +01:00
Vladimír Čunát 5acaa980a5 pull module blacklist from Ubuntu and use it by default
People often have serious problems due to bogus modules like *fb.
2014-01-28 12:52:36 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 407a770161 Rewrite as a pre-boot authentication module (mostly) comforming to the design specification of
'YubiKey Integration for Full Disk Encryption Pre-Boot Authentication (Copyright) Yubico, 2011 Version: 1.1'.

Used binaries:
  * uuidgen - for generation of random sequence numbers
  * ykchalresp - for challenging a Yubikey
  * ykinfo - to check if a Yubikey is plugged in at boot (fallback to passphrase authentication otherwise)
  * openssl - for calculation of SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-1, as well as AES-256-CTR (de/en)cryption

Main differences to the specification mentioned above:
  * No user management (yet), only one password+yubikey per LUKS device
  * SHA-512 instead of CRC-16 for checksum

Main differences to the previous implementation:
  * Instead of changing the key slot of the LUKS device each boot,
    the actual key for the LUKS device will be encrypted itself
  * Since the response for the new challenge is now calculated
    locally with openssl, the MITM-USB-attack with which previously
    an attacker could obtain the new response (that was used as the new
    encryption key for the LUKS device) by listening to the
    Yubikey has ideally become useless (as long as uuidgen can
    successfuly generate new random sequence numbers).

Remarks:
  * This is not downwards compatible to the previous implementation
2014-01-28 04:02:51 +01:00
Rob Vermaas 4ccd60af00 Merge pull request #1178 from chexxor/fix-httpd-ssh
HTTPD: Check for SSL Cert value before building with SSL support.
2014-01-27 12:34:42 -08:00
Petr Rockai 66db1b3a64 nixos: Add a dictd service. 2014-01-25 16:35:02 +01:00
Aristid Breitkreuz 5d3d6b3799 support -Q in nixos-rebuild 2014-01-25 11:20:25 +01:00
Moritz Maxeiner 333f5caaf9 Implement authentication for a LUKS device with a yubikey (HMAC-SHA1); supports simple challenge-response and two-factor authentication 2014-01-25 03:33:09 +01:00
Thomas Tuegel 7b743fcaab networkmanager: load modules required for PPTP 2014-01-24 09:22:59 -06:00
Vladimír Čunát 12235ed36e remove .topmsg (close #1578) 2014-01-23 22:30:07 +01:00
Shea Levy 51de280c0a nixos X tests: wait for logind to link a session to the server
There seems to be some race causing failures if an X command gets in before slim starts the session

Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-01-22 14:23:56 -05:00
Shea Levy d18bc25b95 Rename linuxManualConfig to buildLinux
Signed-off-by: Shea Levy <shea@shealevy.com>
2014-01-21 20:05:55 -05:00